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One of the core debates of the online economy has been whether a
fixed, one-time access fee or a usage-dependent fee would yield greater
return for each player of the online economy. This paper develops a
simple model of the online economy consisting of a single Content
Provider (CP) and a single Network Provider (NP) in order to provide an
insight to this issue.
Three characteristics related to the type of content are identified as
major determinants of level of demand; marginal utility of a unit content
consumption for the marginal consumer, concavity of utility functions,
and denseness of type distribution. Higher utility of consumption,
coupled with less dense type distribution, leads to price insensitivity of
the demand function in terms of number of subscribers. However, a
highly concave utility function is required for price insensitivity of
consumer consumption amount. These content characteristics need to
be considered in designing an optimal pricing strategy for an online
player.
A numerical example illustrates that all fixed pricing might not be
optimal, not only for the purpose of social welfare maximization, but
also for the purpose of consumers’ surplus maximization. It also
highlights the importance of the profit sharing rule in order for a price
alliance to be reached.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the rise of the online economy, pricing of various online
services such as database access, webzines, online gaming, and
network access has been the focal issue for commercial entities,
scholars, and ultimately, consumers. One of the core debates
has been whether a fixed, one-time access fee or some form of
usage-dependent fee such as a connection-time based fee or
packet-consumption based fee would yield greater return for
each player of the online economy (Varian 1993; Fishburn,
Odlyzko and Siders 1997). In the case of network infrastructure
pricing, scholars have long taken the position that some form of
usage-based pricing is socially more efficient than a fixed pricing
practice, since it results in more efficient usage of limited
network resources (Varian 1993). Nevertheless, market forces
have led to a prevalence of fixed-pricing practice. The dominance
of the fixed-pricing format observed in the online industry is
attributed to two forces: almost unanimous preference by the
consumer population (Odlyzko 1996) and fierce competition in
both the network access market and digital contents and
services markets.
Proponents of a fixed pricing format over a usage-based format
have argued that usage-based pricing schemes will discourage
service usage of online consumers for a number of reasons. First,
online consumers are accustomed to fixed and free pricing
schemes for historical reasons and high market competition,
which make them highly price sensitive. Second, in an open
network such as the Internet, consumers cannot foresee the
amount of expected usage accurately, which can be perceived as
a risk factor. Such discouragement of potential online consumers
will lead to a slowdown in the growth of the online economy. As a
result, imposition of a usage-based pricing scheme will reduce
consumers’ surplus due to discouraged usage and higher
perceived risk.
In this paper, a comparison between fixed and usage-based
pricing in the online industry context is presented. The online
industry is assumed to consist of content and network layers.
The network layer represents the connection service for users
whose service is provided by the network provider (NP) whereas
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the content layer consists of players that provide various value-
added services on top of the network layer, whose service is to be
provided by the content provider (CP). In this setting, a vertical
price alliance between a CP and an NP can cause a difference in
efficiency for each pricing format. The pricing schedules of the
CP and the NP determine the total cost consumers have to incur
in content consumption activity. With a price alliance, two
players can coordinate the level of respective prices in a way that
can maximize the joint profit. Without such coordination, each
player will set the respective price so as to maximize the
individual profit. A comparison between alliance and non-
alliance cases will also be explored.
In order for two players to agree and to reach price alliance
agreement, a proper rule for profit allocation needs to be
developed to avoid at least the following two risks. First, a risk of
ambiguity as to profit sharing is always a source of conflict.
Second, one of the participants of the alliance might receive a
lower profit level than the pre-alliance level. A numerical example
illustrates that utilizing concepts of core and Shapley value can
prevent such risks.
The Model section presents the consumer utility model of this
paper, which closely follows literature on telecommunications
demand. The Analysis section explores qualitative differences
among market mechanisms in four market environments
depending on whether the content and network service are
priced based on fixed or usage-dependent pricing. Then,
Numerical Analysis section presents a numerical example
providing additional results that complement those of Analysis
section. It also addresses differences in consumer and total
surplus according to the price scheme of each player. One
possibility suggested here is that an all-fixed pricing environment
(in which both content and network service are charged by fixed
prices) does not yield the maximum level of consumer surplus
compared to that from other pricing cases involving usage-based
price component. This result directly conflicts with the claim by
many online users that usage-based pricing undermines
consumer benefits. This section also derives profit allocation
corresponding to core and Shapley value rules, which are needed
for an alliance to be sustainable. Discussion section examines a
few representative online market and discusses pricing practices
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in each market in association with this paper’ s analytical
results. Finally, Conclusion and Future Research section
provides a summary and discusses limitations and possible
extensions of the paper.
THE MODEL
This paper assumes one of the simplest possible forms of an
online industry structure consisting of only a single content
provider (CP) and a single network provider (NP). Each player is
assumed to have a choice of either fixed or usage-based charge,
leading to a total of four combinations of pricing schemes.
Analysis of such a simplified market structure can be useful in
the following context. First, a specialized content network may be
dedicated to servicing a particular CP. Examples of such
specialized content delivery networks include the Video-on-
Demand (VoD) service network tested by major telcos in the early
to mid 1990s (Johnson 1993; Han 1996) and specialized
database networks such as LEXIS-NEXIS. Second, there may be
a single provider of collection of contents and the CP imposes a
single pricing scheme that depends only on the amount of
content consumption by users. Then, the basket of contents can
be treated as a single product provided by a single CP.
The unit of charge in the usage-based pricing can differ
according to the market context and the feasibility of the billing
system. The most common practice of usage-based pricing is to
charge a fee proportional to the amount of usage time. In other
cases, the content usage may be measured according to different
criteria such as the number of articles users access. The
difference among these units for charge under the usage-based
pricing scheme can usually be accommodated trivially by
converting the units for charging under different schemes. In this
paper, the usage-based pricing case is examined with time-based
usage charges for both network service and content
consumption.
Following a widely employed assumption in literature on two-
part tariffs (Coase 1946; Oi 1971; Littlechild 1975; Schmalensee
1981), a general model of consumer decisions on content
consumption activity is presented in this section. The
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heterogeneity of consumers is represented by a one-dimensional
continuum of type parameter v. Consumers of the same type
group are assumed to exhibit the same content consumption
pattern.
Each consumer is further assumed to determine whether to
subscribe to the network service and to purchase the content, as
well as the optimal amount of usage according to the following
two-stage model. In the first stage, each consumer observes
whether the expected net benefit at the optimal content
consumption amount from the second stage is positive. If this
net benefit is positive, the consumer subscribes to the network
service and purchases content, and vice versa. In the second
stage, with the assumption that the consumer has already
subscribed to the network service, each consumer decides on the
optimal amount of content consumption so as to maximize the
net utility.
Let x be the amount of time consumers spend in the content
consumption activity (and therefore, the amount of time spent
online). A consumer belonging to type v has a utility function,
U(x, v). Each consumer type v maximizes the net benefit U(x, v) –
p(x), where p(x) is the total consumer’s cost associated with the
content usage level of x. We denote the optimal level of content
usage from the net benefit maximization problem by x*. Then, x*
will be dependent on the usage-based portion of the consumers’
cost function, p(x). Let pfc and puc represent fixed and usage-based
price, respectively, charged by the CP and pfN and be those
charged by the NP. For example, if the content is charged by the
amount of usage whereas the network service price is fixed so
that p(x) = puC + pfN, the type v consumer’s usage demand function
will be x*(puC, v) As long as there is any usage-dependent
component in the total consumer’s price, each consumer type’s
optimal usage level will be dependent on the usage-based
component of the total price.
The following assumptions on the properties of the utility
function have been frequently made in the telecommunications
pricing literature (Wilson 1993).
Assumption 1. The type parameter v is distributed according
to the distribution function F(v), which is continuous and
differentiable in [0, -v].
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Assumption 2. Utility increases as more content is consumed
and diminishing marginal return of content usage applies, i.e., 
and .
Assumption 3. Higher type consumer derives higher utility
and higher marginal utility from content consumption at all 
levels of consumption, i.e., and .
Assumption 1 and assumption 2 establish that each consumer’
s utility function is continuous, differentiable, and concave.
Assumption 3 says that consumers with a higher type parameter
receive higher utility from content consumption activity at any
level of usage so that the utility functions of different types of
consumers do not cross at any ranges of usage level. This no-
crossing property of the utility function guarantees that the
consumer with the higher type parameter will demand more than
the lower type consumer at all price schedules, as figure 1
illustrates (Wilson 1993). For simplicity, the responsiveness of
the utility function to the change in the type parameter, ∂U(x,
v)/∂v, is referred to as the “denseness of utility functions” in the
sense that if utility functions across types of consumers are more
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Figure 1. Determination of Optimal Usage Level.
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type parameter will cause a small increase in the utility level at
the same usage level. In other words, if the incremental utility at
a given consumption level between successive users along the
type parameter is small, the market is characterized by a “dense”
utility function. In fig. 1, such incremental utility can be
represented by a vertical distance between U(x, v) and U(x, v’).
In figure 1, each customer determines the usage level so as to
maximize the net benefit, U(x, v) – p(x). At this optimal usage
point, the slope of U and p(x) are equal, following the rule that
marginal utility equals marginal cost.
ANALYSIS
Fixed Content and Fixed Network Pricing
When both prices are fixed, a consumer ’ s net benefit
maximization problem will not be bounded by the price
constraint as long as the marginal utility from content
consumption is nonnegative. It will, however, be bounded by
other resource constraints faced by consumers, such as a time
constraint. As long as there exists any binding resource
constraint (which will always be the case in reality), the net
benefit maximization problem will yield a finite usage level, x*,
for each consumer. Such a “ loosely bounded” benefit
maximization problem is likely to yield a much larger optimal
usage amount than implied by other pricing environments that
include any usage-based components. Nevertheless, demand will
still be dependent on the type parameter due to assumption 3.
On the other hand, the fixed price component will not affect the
customer’s usage optimization problems. Thus, the customer
type v’s demand function will only be dependent on the type
parameter, and thus can be expressed as x*(v).
A marginal consumer v̂ who is indifferent between subscribing
and not subscribing and faces a fixed content and network price
is determined by the relationship
U(x*(v̂), v̂) = pfC + pfN (1)
Consumers with positive net benefit at the offered price levels
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will subscribe to the network service and purchase the content.
The fraction of the total population that subscribes to both the
content and the network service is therefore obtained by
aggregating consumers with positive net benefit. Let DC and DN
be the fraction of the total population that subscribes to the
content and the network service, respectively. Then,
DC = DN = ∫
∞
v̂
dF(v) = G(v̂) (2)
where G(v) = 1– F(v).
Then, the actual amount of network usage in the market is
derived by aggregating usage levels of individuals.
X = ∫ v̂
v̂
x*(v) dF(v). (3)
The determination of the rank order of the marginal consumer
as per (1) affects the demand size for the CP and the NP.
Proposition 1. Under all fixed pricing environment, a unit
increase in price will cause large reduction in number of
subscribers when consumer utility function is densely
distributed.
Proof. All proofs are in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 says that if utility functions are “dense” in a
sense that consumer distribution density is high around the
given level of type parameter, an increase in the price level will
cause a rather large change in the marginal consumer’ s rank,
thereby leading to large decrease in number of subscribers.
Therefore, when utility functions are densely distributed along
the type parameter so that an incremental utility between higher
type consumer and a lower type one is small, players should be
careful in increasing the price level since it can trigger a large
increase in the rank of the marginal consumer.
With fixed content and network pricing, the respective profit
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max πN = pfNG(v̂(pfC, pfN)) (5)
where v̂(pfC, pfN) is implicitly determined by (1).





From (6) and (7), the CP and the NP set respective prices such
that the rate of increase in the profit due to the higher price is
offset by the decrease in the profit due to the forfeiture of those
consumers dropping their subscriptions. The rate at which
consumers withdraw subscription is inversely proportional to the
change in the utility attained at the optimal usage level of the
marginal consumer. Again, less dense (or “sparse”) utility
functions will make the magnitude of the second terms in (6) and
(7) small, resulting in higher optimal price for both players.
The CP and the NP involved in a price alliance will solve the
following joint profit maximization problem.
(8)
Optimality conditions with respect to pfC and pfN yield the
following redundant equations.
(9)
Proposition 2. Consumers face lower total cost of content
consumption under price alliance arrangement when both the
CP and the NP employ fixed pricing schemes. As a result, total
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price alliance in all fixed pricing environment.
Notice, however, that which of the two players will generate
more profit from the alliance case is uncertain without a
predetermined profit sharing rule.
Usage-Based Content Pricing and Usage-Based Network Pricing
Under usage-based pricing for both content and network
service, the marginal consumer satisfies
(10)
and the total content consumption by all subscribers, which
coincides with the total network service usage, is
(11)
Proposition 3. Under all usage-based pricing environment, a
unit increase in price will cause large reduction in number of
subscribers when consumer utility function is densely
distributed and when subscribers consume large amount of
content.
The numerator of (A2) can be seen as a calibrating factor that
explains how the marginal consumer determination under
usage-based pricing is different from that of fixed pricing. The
numerator represents the change in the customer’s cost due to
the change in the optimal usage level triggered by the increase in
price. With a unit price increase, customers face higher cost by
the amount of the optimal usage level. It represents the change
in the marginal consumer’s net benefit in the event of a price
increase. If the extent of fall in the marginal consumer’s net
benefit in response to the price increase is large, the rank order
of the marginal consumer will respond sensitively to the change
in price. From this, the impact of a change in usage-based price
on number of subscribers is large if consumers’ optimal usage
amount is large. On the other hand, the effect of the denseness
of utility function to usage-based price component can be
interpreted similarly as in the all-fixed pricing environment.
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Proposition 4. Under all usage-based pricing environment, a
unit increase in price will cause large reduction in number of
subscribers when the extent of decrease in marginal utility of an
additional unit of content consumption is small.
The change in the optimal usage level of each consumer in
response to a change in the usage-based price is dependent on
the concavity of the utility function. If the extent of decrease in
marginal utility of an additional unit of content consumption is
large (i.e., if it is highly concave), the sensitivity of consumers’
usage levels to a price change will be small.
Proposition 5. Under all usage-based pricing environment, a
unit increase in price will cause large reduction in total amount
of content consumption when consumer utility function is
densely distributed, when subscribers consume large amount of
content and when the extent of decrease in marginal utility of an
additional unit of content consumption is small.
With usage-based content and network pricing, the respective
profit maximization problems are
CP’s Problem: (12)
NP’s Problem: (13)
where is implicitly determined by (11).
Substituting (A6) and (A7) into the first-order conditions for






















X p p v p








∫( , , ˆ)





































X p p v p








∫( , , ˆ)
( , , )
( )–ˆ















p X p p vπ =










p X p p vπ =
Fixed vs. Usage-Based Pricing 13
Again, less concave and denser utility functions will lead to a
larger reduction in the amount of usage in response to a price
increase, leading to a lower optimal price level.
In the alliance case, the joint profit maximization problem is
Allying firm’s problem: (16)
The first-order conditions are as follows.
(17)
(18)
Proposition 6. As in the all fixed pricing environment,
consumers face lower total cost of content consumption under
price alliance arrangement when both the CP and the NP employ
usage-based pricing schemes. As a result, total consumers’ and
producers’ surplus will both increase under price alliance in all
usage-based pricing environment.
As noted in all fixed pricing case, when two players use the
same pricing scheme, the optimality conditions in the alliance
case yields a redundant equation. Therefore, the optimality
condition will be satisfied by a collection of price pairs, (puC, puN).
Again, this results in an ambiguity as to which of these price
pairs the two players should agree to charge.
Fixed Content Pricing and Usage-Based Network Pricing
In a single-content environment, the usage-based network and
fixed content pricing case yield qualitatively the same result as
the fixed network and usage-based pricing case. Therefore, this
section concentrates on one of these two possible asymmetric
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pricing schedule, the total cost for the consumer is p(x) = pfC +
puN x. The marginal consumer then satisfies
(19)
The fraction of the total population subscribing to the content
and the network service (which is the demand function for the
CP) is
(20)
and the total amount of usage (which is the demand function for
the NP) is
(21)
Differentiating (19) with respect to pfC and p uN, applying
Envelope Theorem and rearranging yields
and (22)
Implications of (22) are readily deducible from proposition 1
and proposition 3.



















X p v p
dX
dp









G v p G
dv
dp
= + ′ ≡(ˆ)
ˆ
0


















ˆ ( ,  ˆ)



















( (ˆ),  ˆ)
ˆ
v






X x p v dF vN
u
v
v= ∗∫  ( ,  ) ( ).ˆ
 
D dF v G vC v
v
= =∫ˆ ( ) (ˆ)







u( ( ,  ˆ),  ˆ) * ( ,  ˆ).∗ = +
Fixed vs. Usage-Based Pricing 15
The allying firm’s profit maximization problem is
Allying firm’s problem: (27)




Proposition 7. As in the all fixed and all usage-based pricing
environments, consumers face lower total cost of content
consumption under price alliance arrangement when the CP
employs fixed pricing and the NP employs usage-based pricing
scheme. As a result, total consumers’ and producers’ surplus will
both increase under price alliance in this mixed pricing
environment.
From (28) and (29), players under the alliance take into
account the effect of own price on the change in the partner’s
profit. With this consideration, both players will set lower prices
than those implied by (25) and (26). Unlike the symmetric pricing
cases, an alliance under asymmetric pricing will generally yield a
unique optimal price pair that satisfies (28) and (29). However, as
will be shown in Numerical Analysis section, this optimal
cooperative price pair might lead to a decrease in one player’s
profit. The reason for this is that if one player’s demand function
is too sensitive to a change in the other player’s price change, the
optimal price under the alliance attempts to compensate for this
effect by keeping the other player’s price low. This effect might be
significant enough to make the profitability of that player lower
than his non-alliance level. Under certain situations, the gaining
player must compensate the losing player for its loss in order for
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A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
For a more concrete illustration of the insights from Analysis
section and a demonstration of the profit sharing issue, the
following numerical example is utilized. Let U(x, v)= vx – 2–
1 x2 and
type parameter v be uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. Furthermore,
assume that each consumer has a resource constraint that renders
the maximum amount of content consumption for the consumer
type v as v. The calculation processes of relevant numerical results
are included in Appendix B.
Table 1 summarizes outcomes of interest from this numerical
example. An examination of table 1 yields several observations
and insights. First, the joint profits of the CP and the NP are
maximized under the asymmetric pricing environment for both
non-alliance and alliance cases. With the price alliance
agreement in the asymmetric pricing environment, consumers
essentially face a two-part tariff. A two-part tariff is more effective
in extracting consumer surplus than a tariff consisting of only a
fixed or a usage-based component. Via observation of the same
result in the absence of a price alliance, it is conjectured that
when fixed and usage-based components are both present,
players are more efficient in extracting consumer surplus even
without the price alliance arrangement.
As expected, the market penetration, represented by v̂, and the
total amount of content consumption, are the highest under all
fixed pricing environments. Therefore, it is confirmed that the
fixed-pricing only environment encourages subscription and
content consumption. However, consumer surplus is not the
highest in all fixed pricing environments with or without a price
alliance. In the long debate between proponents of the adoption
of fixed pricing and those favoring usage-based pricing, the
major argument of the former has been that usage-based pricing
will greatly undermine consumer benefits. Here, this claim is
shown not to hold. Fixed pricing environments are not only the
least efficient in terms of total surplus in both alliance and non-
alliance cases, they are also not the most efficient one in terms of
consumers’ surplus alone. This result highlights the importance
of providing incentives to the market in terms of growing the
total market size. Compared to the all fixed pricing
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environments, other pricing environments are more efficient in
achieving the higher market efficiency due to more optimized
consumer consumption behavior induced by usage-based
portion of the tariff they face. As a result, contrary to
conventional conjecture, consumers are better off under pricing
environment with some usage-based component in comparison
to the situation with all fixed pricing scheme.
The total surplus, defined as the sum of consumer and
producer surplus, is maximized under asymmetric pricing when
there is no price alliance. When players form a price alliance, on
the other hand, the total surplus is maximized under all usage-
based pricing cases.
The join profit maximization effort results in a higher aggregate
profit level compared to the non-alliance level in all four cases.
Therefore, a coalitional form representation of these scenarios is
superadditive.1) From an individual player ’s perspective,
however, cooperative pricing yields either an obscure pricing
decision or an incentive incompatibility. From the symmetric
pricing environment in which both the CP and the NP employ
either fixed or usage-based pricing policies, the optimal pricing
decision under the alliance yields only a linear relationship
between price levels of the CP and the NP. Some of these feasible
optimal price levels might leave one of the players worse off
compared to the non-alliance pricing case. Restricting the price
levels to be inside the core of the game will resolve such issues.
Under the asymmetric pricing environment in which one player
employs fixed pricing and the other player exercises usage-based
pricing, joint profit maximization yields the result that the player
with the fixed-pricing receives a lower profit level than the one
from a non-alliance. In this case, a side payment from the player
with the usage-based fee to the one with the fixed fee is
necessary in order to avoid breakdown of the alliance. The
amount of the side payment, of course, needs to be set such that
both players are inside the core. The specific ranges of payoff
division and side payment amount corresponding to the core, as
well as particular amount of payoff division and side payment
corresponding to Shapley allocation corresponding to the
number example of this section are calculated and illustrated in
18 Seoul Journal of Business
1) For an overview of cooperative game theory, refer to Eichberger (1993) and
Weber (1994).
table 2.
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Table 1. Summary of Outcomes in Various Pricing Environments
Symmetric Pricing Asymmetric Pricing2
Content Pricing Fixed Usage-Based Fixed
Network Pricing Fixed Usage-Based Usage-Based
Content Price 0.16(fixed) 0.25(per unit) 0.1361(fixed)
Network Service Price 0.16(fixed) 0.25(per unit) 0.2174(per unit)
Marginal Consumer Rank 0.8 0.5 0.7391
Total Content Usage 0.18 0.125 0.1701
Content Demand3 0.2 0.125 0.2609
Network Demand3 0.2 0.125 0.1701
CP’s Profit 0.032 0.03125 0.0355
NP’s Profit 0.032 0.03125 0.0369
Joint Profit 0.064 0.0625 0.0725
Consumers’ Surplus 0.0173 0.0208 0.0207




Network Service Price 0.2(per unit)
Marginal Consumer Rank 0.6667 0.333 0.6
Total Content Usage 0.2778 0.222 0.24
Content Demand 0.333 0.222 0.4





Joint Profit 0.0742 0.0742 0.08
Consumers’ Surplus 0.0432 0.0494 0.0427
Total Surplus 0.1174 0.1236 0.1227
2 The usage-based content, fixed network pricing scenario yields symmetrically
equivalent result and therefore, is eliminated from Table 1.
3 Content and network demand are expressed as the fraction of the total
population when the price is fixed and as the total amount of usage by all
subscribers when the price is usage-based.
4 In symmetric pricing cases, the optimal price under a price alliance is
expressed in terms of the sum. Thus, the respective optimal prices for the CP


















In order to facilitate the discussion of various pricing schemes
of real-world online content services, Table 3 has been
constructed. In the first four services, services are provided on
top of “open” Internet infrastructure so that there is no price
alliance between content and network service providers. On the
other hand, mobile Internet service is regarded as a “closed”
content market (Oh 2007), in which only subscribers of the
distribution NP have access to the content provided by a CP.
Consequently, due to exclusive nature of business relationship
between these players, it is likely that pricing of content and
network services are coordinated at least in an implicit manner.
Online movie or music service sites such as Blockbuster
Online and Apple’s iTunes Music store employ fixed charge
schemes as in table 3. Online news service such as Wall Street
Journal Online also employs fixed charge scheme although a
fixed price is applied to a bundle of both online and offline
subscription services. Network infrastructure for these three
content services is Internet which is normally provided by
broadband Internet service providers these days. Thus, we can
regard these three cases to correspond to the fixed content, fixed
network pricing situation. In this situation, as proposition 1
indicated, denseness of distribution of utility functions of
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Table 2. Core and Shapley Value under Price Alliance
Content
Fixed Usage-Based Fixed Usage-Based
Pricing
Network 
Fixed Usage-Based Usage-Based Fixed
Pricing
Core 0.032≤πJC≤0.042 0.031≤πJC≤0.074 0≤T≤0.048 0.004≤T≤0.011
Shapley T = 0.0073 T = 0.0073
Value






































consumers determines price sensitivity of demands for these
content services. For general content services such as music and
movie services, it is likely that utility functions are highly dense
since these contents probably attract large consumer pool so
that incremental utility between successive consumers is likely
to be small. Thus, demand functions for these services are likely
to be rather price sensitive, requiring careful examination of
demand characteristics in determining optimal price level. On
the other hand, specialized content such as Wall Street Journal
articles probably have smaller consumer base. In this case, the
demand is likely to be price sensitive and the optimal price can
be set rather high. This line of reasoning conforms to our
intuition that associates a lower price with general contents and
a premium price with specialized and focused contents (Chae
and Flores 1998.)
The Lexis-Nexis service database service is an example of
usage-based content pricing and fixed network pricing context.
In this situation, proposition 3, proposition 4 and proposition 5
indicates that not only the denseness of utility functions of
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Table 3. Examples of Content-Network Pricing Schemes of Online
Services
Service Blockbuster iTunes Music Wall Street Lexis- Korean 




Content $23.99/ Movie: $579.6 for $6.00/link or $0.3~
Pricing movie $9.99~ online and $6.00/cite or $2.00/content





Network Market Market Market Market $0.0013~
Pricing Internet Internet Internet Internet $0.0065/
Access ChargeAccess Charge Access ChargeAccess Charge packet
Price No No No No Yes
Alliance?
consumers, but also the optimal usage level of each consumer as
well as concavity of utility functions affects the price sensitivity
of demand in terms of both number of subscribers and total
amount of content usage. In line with the argument in the
preceding paragraph, the specialized and focused nature of
Lexis-Nexis articles probably renders its demand in terms of both
number of subscribers and amount of usage to be price
insensitive. Also, the optimal usage level of typical Lexis-Nexis
users is conjectured to be rather low compared to the usage level
of general content services which contributes to price
insensitivity of its demand. On the other hand, the extent of
decrease in marginal utility of additional content is conjectured
to be large due to specific purpose and focus of these articles for
their consumers, which is suggestive of price insensitivity. From
these, demand for article service of Lexis-Nexis in terms of
number of users and amount of usage is likely to be highly price
insensitive.
Mobile Internet service is an example of all usage-based pricing
with price alliance case. In this situation, as illustrated by
proposition 6, consumers are likely to face lower cost of content
consumption compared to the case in which content and
network service providers are not involved in exclusive business
relationship. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In the setup of the two-stage consumers’ behavior model of this
chapter, three characteristics of utility functions of consumers —
the marginal utility of a unit content consumption for the
marginal consumer, concavity of utility functions, and denseness
of type distribution — are identified as primary factors
determining the price sensitivity of number of subscribers and
the total amount of usage of consumers. Higher utility of
consumption, coupled with sparse type distribution, leads to
price insensitivity of the demand function in terms of number of
subscribers. However, a highly concave utility function is
required for price insensitivity of the consumers’ consumption
amount. Thus, a balance among these characteristics during the
content product design phase as well as a suitable pricing
22 Seoul Journal of Business
strategy in accordance with the product design is needed.
These content product characteristics can be linked to the type
of contents under consideration. A requirement for a large
marginal benefit implies that a CP needs to make efforts to
provide updated value to consumers who have already
experienced the content offering in order to command a high
price premium. On the other hand, a content offering highly
focused on a specific consumer segment is likely to exhibit a
large “gap” between the low willingness-to-pay group and the
high willingness-to-pay group. If the current price is set around
the region between the low valuation group and the high
valuation group, the price can be increased without much
reduction in the number of subscribers.
Depending on the combination of usage-based and fixed
pricing schemes between the CP and the NP, the actual
determination of the subscriber set and the usage level is a
complicated and is an inter-linked process. When both the CP
and the NP employ fixed pricing, the pricing schedule is not a
binding constraint for the consumer’s second-stage optimal
usage determination. Therefore, the usage level determination is
subject to other resource limitations, such as time constraints.
The first-stage subscription decision is determined by the
sensitivity of the rank of the marginal consumer to the price
changes. This sensitivity was shown to be inversely proportional
to the sensitivity of the utility function to the type parameter. In
turn, this sensitivity depends on both the marginal utility of the
marginal consumer and the denseness of the type parameter
distribution at the marginal consumer’s rank.
With the existence of a usage-based component in the total
price schedule for consumers, the description of the subscriber
set and usage level determination is even more complicated. The
complication arises from the fact that, in determining the
marginal consumer, a change in the usage price affects the
optimal usage level of the marginal consumer. Extra attention to
the benefit and the cost due to this changed optimal usage level
needs to be paid in describing the subscriber set determination
process. Nevertheless, the influence of the aforementioned three
characteristics on the demand sensitivity in terms of number of
subscribers and consumption level is still seen to be the same
when the usage-based pricing component is present.
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In a symmetric pricing scenario of all fixed or all usage-based
pricing environments, a price alliance between the CP and the NP
yields only a linear relationship between the two elements of the
optimal price pair. This indeterminate description of the optimal
price pair is a source for dispute between potential alliance
partners in that profit levels of participants of the alliance
depend on which specific price pair the allying parties agree to
exercise. On the other hand, in an asymmetric pricing scenario,
a unique optimal price pair exists for alliance partners as long as
the joint profit function is a well-defined concave function.
However, as shown in Numerical Analysis section, a price
alliance can lead to a decrease in the profit of one of the alliance
partners. The aforementioned two potential obstacles for an
alliance formation can be resolved by an application of core and
Shapley allocation rules, which are demonstrated in Numerical
Analysis section.
This paper models a pricing behavior and its consequences in
a hypothetical online content market in which there is one CP
and one NP. One of the significant modeling limitations of this
paper is that only a single CP is included in the market.
Incorporation of multiple CP case will undoubtedly facilitate a
much richer discussion of a more realistic picture of online
content markets. For example, nature of relationship among
multiple contents in terms of substitutability can possibly either
strengthen or weaken the effectiveness of prices alliance between
NP and CP’s. Furthermore, under such environment, price
competition and alliance can occur both horizontally and
vertically and such various market configurations will influence
the effectiveness of pricing schemes and its determinants.
Although this paper intends to focus on vertical relationship
between CP and NP in assessing implications of various pricing
scheme arrangements, inclusion of multiple CP’s is deemed to be
a necessary direction for extension of this paper.
Another model limitation worth mentioning stems from the
assumption that pC and pN are simultaneously determined. In
reality, depending on specific market situation, either one of the
price levels might have been determined by the time of
determination of the other. Such price leadership normally
entails significant strategic implications. It is conjectured that in
many cases, NP is likely to possess price leadership due to its
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physical precedence over content services as well as its scale and
scope economics. Incorporation of price leadership is expected to
affect results of this paper which is another possible topic of
further research.
APPENDIX A. Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. 
Differentiating (1) by pfC and pfN, applying Envelope Theorem
and rearranging yields
(A1)
From (A1), an increase in either the CP or the NP’s fixed price
causes large increase in the rank of the marginal consumer, v̂,
thereby leading to a large decrease in number of subscribers
when the utility function is densely distributed.
Proof of Proposition 2.
From (9), the CP and the NP can choose any combination of
price pairs that satisfy (9). Comparing (9) with (6) and (7), the
first-order conditions with respect to either pfC or pfN are imposed
on the sum p fC + p fN under the joint profit maximization.
Consequently, the optimal price levels of pfC and pfN under the
price alliance will be lower, resulting in higher consumer surplus
than that in the non-allying case. Since joint profit maximization
also yields higher producer surplus compared to non-allying
case, the total welfare will be enhanced in the joint profit
maximization case.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Differentiating (10) with respect to puC and puN, applying
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From (A2), an increase in either the CP or the NP’s usage-
based price causes large increase in the rank of the marginal
consumer, v̂, thereby leading to a large decrease in number of
subscribers when the utility function is densely distributed and
when the optimal content consumption level of the marginal
consumer is large.
Proof of Proposition 4. 
Each consumer’s utility function maximization yields
(A3)




Hence, the responsiveness of each consumer’s optimal usage
level to a change in usage-based price is inversely proportional to
the concavity of the utility function.
Proof of Proposition 5.
The effect of changes in the usage-based price on the total
amount of content consumption can be seen by differentiating
(11) with respect to puC and puN.
(A6)
(A7)
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concavity of utility function is small by Proposition 4. Given
that and  are negative, the second terms are positive 
and large when    and   are large and x*(puC, puN, v̂) is large.
By Proposition 3, such condition is satisfied when x*(puC, puN, v̂)
is large and when is small.
Proof of Proposition 6.
From (17) and (18), which are identical since , the CP
and the NP can choose any combination of price pairs that
satisfy (17) and (18). Comparing (17) and (18) with (14) and (15),
the first-order conditions with respect to either puC or puN are
imposed on the sum puC + puN under the joint profit maximization.
Consequently, the optimal price levels of puC and puN under the
price alliance will be lower, resulting in higher consumer surplus
than that in the non-allying case. Since joint profit maximization
also yields higher producer surplus compared to non-allying
case, the total welfare will be enhanced in the joint profit
maximization case.
Proof of Proposition 7.
Comparing (25) and (26) with (28) and (29), the first-order
conditions with respect to either puC or puN are imposed on the
sum puC + puN under the joint profit maximization. Consequently,
the optimal price levels of  puC and puN under the price alliance will
be lower, resulting in higher consumer surplus than that in the
non-allying case. Since joint profit maximization also yields
higher producer surplus compared to non-allying case, the total
welfare will be enhanced in the joint profit maximization case. 
APPENDIX B. Derivation of Numerical Analysis Results
Fixed Content and Network Pricing
Since there is no usage-based cost associated with the content
consumption activity, each user will consume the maximum
amount of content that yields the individual usage demand
function of x*(v)=v. The marginal consumer satisfies the
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Total content usage by subscribers is
The first-order conditions yield the following price reaction
functions:
and
In order to distinguish between optimal price and profit levels
from the price alliance and those from a non-alliance and to
discern optimal variable levels from general variable designation,
the following changes in the variable naming convention are
adopted. The superscript J designates variables from price
alliance whereas no superscript denotes variables from non-
alliance. An asterisk next to a variable denotes the optimal level
derived from the example of Numerical Analysis section.
The demand under the joint profit maximization is
The Profit Possibility Frontier (PPF)6) is defined by the
relationship between the optimal price pair, . Sincep pCJ NJ*  *+ =
2
9
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6) PPF is a set of profit pairs that results from a successful collusion (Slade and
Jacquemin, 1992).
. Thus, the
PPF is defined by the set of profit pairs
and 
The core is defined by the following two conditions:
which yield the set of price pairs
and 
The resulting profit range corresponding to the core on the PPF
is
and .
On the other hand, the Shapley value rule yields the relationship
.
Thus, (pJC*, pJN*) = implies a price pair congruent to the
Shapley value rule. The profit pair corresponding to the Shapley
value rule is (πJC*, πJN*) = .
Usage-Based Content and Network Pricing
Consumer’s benefit maximization yields the following optimal
usage demand function:
The marginal consumer v̂ satisfies U(v̂ – puC – puN, v̂) = (puC + puN) 
(v̂ – puC – puN), which, in turn, yields the following results:
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.




From the optimal price relationship, , PPF is
and .
The core is derived from conditions 0.3125 and 
0.03125, which yields 
pJC ≥ 0.140625 pJN* ≥ 0.140625 and pJC* + pJN* = .
From this, the core is
0.0312 ≤ πJC ≤ 0.074 and πJN = – πJC.
The shaply value is derived from 
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and .
Fixed Content and Usage-Based Network Pricing
The consumer maximizes the benefit function, –pfC–pfNx.
From this,
The marginal consumer satisfies 
. From this, 
The reaction functions are
and
From table 1, the profit for the CP decreases after the alliance
and, therefore, the NP needs to make up for this loss by making
a side payment to the CP. Let T be the amount of this side
payment. The PPF is defined by the amount of the side payment
from the NP to the CP. Since πN = 0.048, 0 ≤ T ≤ 0.048. Thus, the
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πC = 0.032 + T, πN = 0.048 – T, 0 ≤ T ≤ 0.048
The core is defined by πCJ* + T ≥ πC* and πJN* – T ≥ πN from which
the relationship πC* – πCJ* ≤ T ≤ πJN* – πN* results. From this, 
0.0035 ≤ T ≤ 0.0111
and the resulting profit ranges are
0.0355 ≤ πCJ ≤ 0.0431, 0.0369 ≤ πJN ≤0.0445 and πCJ + πJN =0.08.
The Shapley value rule tells us that (πJN* – T)– πN* = (πCJ* + T)–
πCJ* from which, results. Thus,
T = 0.0073, (πJC, πJN) = (0.0393, 0.0407).
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